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INTRODUCTION 
Entrepreneurs in a competitive economy face three fundamental problems. They need to search for 
and discover a business opportunity (Kirzner, 1973), evaluate it (Knight, 1921), and then seize the 
opportunity to reap entrepreneurial profits (Schumpeter, 1911) (Langlois, 2007). The problem that 
we address is how the ability to exploit business opportunities is influenced by entrepreneurial search 
and the economic organization of entrepreneurship (Arrow, 1962; Lippman & Rumelt, 2003; Aghion 
et al., 2005; Foss et al., 2007). In many cases, the discovery for a new business opportunity needs to 
be motivated by expected gains, since the search and evaluation of business opportunities is a costly, 
resource-consuming process (Denrell, Fang & Winter, 2003; Nickerson & Zenger, 2004; Foss & 
Klein, 2005; Teece, 2007; Foss & Foss, 2008).1 We show the critical role of expectations for 
understanding of the economic organization of entrepreneurship, and argue that transaction cost 
economics, with its insistence on bounded rationality, but far-sighted contracting offers useful 
insights and presents rich opportunities for further theoretical and empirical research (cf. also 
Furubotn, 2002).   
Prior research on entrepreneurship has evolved around three core research questions, namely 
why, when, and how 1) entrepreneurial opportunities arise, 2) certain individuals and firms and not 
others discover and exploit opportunities, and 3) different modes of action are used to exploit these 
opportunities (Shane & Venkataram, 2000). Hence, many scholars in the entrepreneurship field have 
argued that entrepreneurship studies should embrace the discovery of opportunities as the main 
construct and unit of analysis of entrepreneurship research (Shane, 2000; Shane & Venkatarmaran, 
2000; McMullen & Sheperd, 2006; McMullen, Plummer & Acs, 2007). However, the discovery of 
an opportunity is only one step in the entrepreneurial process (Companys & McMullen, 2007).  
Entrepreneurship can be more thoroughly grounded by adopting the understanding of 
entrepreneurship as judgment (Foss & Klein, 2005; Klein, 2008), drawing on a long history in 
economic thought (Cantillon, 1755; Knight, 1921; Mises, 1949). This understanding of 
entrepreneurship goes beyond opportunity discovery by including the evaluation and exploitation of 
opportunities into the analysis, and focusing on investments and asset ownership as key to realizing 
opportunities (Klein, 2008). It therefore provides a natural link to the theory of the firm that is not 
provided by the notion of opportunity discovery (Foss & Klein, 2005). Specifically, the unit of 
analysis is not so much the opportunity, but the rather the investment into and assembly of resources 
in the present in anticipation of uncertain receipts in the future. That conceptualization of the firm 
also ties into in the resource-based view of strategy that sees the firm as a legal shell holding a 
                                                 
1 Even Kirzner (1973) who denies that there are opportunity costs to entrepreneurship argues that profits alert 
entrepreneurs to the hitherto undiscovered profit opportunities. 
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bundle or coalition of resources (Alchian, 1984; Lippman & Rumelt, 2003a: 909). The economic 
organization of entrepreneurship is therefore fundamentally concerned with how resources interact to 
create and to appropriate value (Lippman & Rumelt, 2003b; Foss & Foss, 2005, 2008; Alvarez & 
Barney, 2004).  
 One way to capture the economic organization of entrepreneurship is by means of the notion of 
a business model. We are not the first to suggest this possibility. Zott and Amit (2008: 2) explicitly 
link business opportunity, value creation, and business models: “A business model depicts the design 
of transaction content, structure, and governance so as to create value through the exploitation of 
business opportunities.” Business models have attracted substantial attention in the practitioner 
literature, but much less in academic research (cf. Amit & Zott, 2001; Chesborough & Rosenbloom, 
2003; Zott & Amit, 2008; Teece, 2007 for notable exceptions). A business model may be seen as a 
set of instructions to address how an entrepreneur creates and appropriates value in combination with 
other resource owners under uncertainty. In terms of the judgment perspective, entrepreneurs are 
individuals who decide on, implement, and adapt business models to discover and exploit business 
opportunities. This entails managing a coalition of resources to create value and to stake out a 
bargaining position that allows for the appropriation of value (Lippman & Rumelt, 2003b; Ryall & 
MacDonald, 2004). The entrepreneurial process is inherently uncertain, since the value of a business 
opportunity becomes only apparent after it has been implemented. It also implies that we adopt a 
functional view of entrepreneurship (Klein, 2008): An entrepreneur is simply defined as an (any) 
individual who discovers and exploits an uncertain and novel business opportunity and bears the 
business risk of exercising her judgment.2  
 Following the landmark work of Schumpeter (1934), a business opportunity can usefully be 
defined as a profitable recombination of resources in novel ways. The potential for combing 
resources is enormous and non-computable (Rivkin, 2000; Denrell, Fang & Winter, 2003; Becker, 
Knudsen & March, 2006). Entrepreneurs operate in an environment with a vast set of possible 
resource combinations. Apart from luck, probing this opportunity set requires some form of pre-
selection and guided search (Cattani, Dorsch & Winter, 2007). Guidance may be provided by 
expectations about the abilities to appropriate a business opportunity (Arrow, 1962; Denrell, Fang & 
Winter, 2003; Foss & Foss, 2008). Lippman and Rumelt (2003a: 924) argue that “entrepreneurial 
energy and innovation are starkly biased towards the creation of those surpluses which can be 
appropriated by the innovator.” However, precious little is known about how exactly expectations 
                                                 
2 In contrast, the occupational perspective on entrepreneurship defines entrepreneurship as self-employment (e.g. Parker, 
2004), while the structural approaches take the start-up company as the main unit of analysis (e.g. Aldrich, 1990) (cf. 
Klein, 2008) 
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about value appropriation drive entrepreneurial search and the design of business models. 
Transaction cost economies, possibly combined with insights from property rights theory and 
organizational economics in general, might provide a useful analytical lens to analyze this 
relationship. Transaction cost economics has a long tradition of highlighting the role of contractual 
safeguards to protect a contracting party from expropriation and for its willingness to make specific 
investments (Williamson, 1985). Likewise, the new property rights approach’s paradigmatic problem 
is how the ex post bargaining position of a party influences the ex ante incentives to invest into an 
asset or activity (Hart, 1995). The same basic analytical structure may be found in recent 
contributions to organizational economics (Rajan & Zingales, 2001).  
 What unites these three approaches is that the expected ability to appropriate value 
fundamentally influences the incentives to engage in value-creating activities. Despite the similarity, 
there are also sharp differences, primarily in the basic behavioral assumptions made. Transaction cost 
economics embraces bounded rationality, uncertainty, and adaptation, while the new property rights 
approach and organizational economics highlight rational expectations, optimization, and strategic 
interactions. Still, we show that these approaches all have the potential to further our understanding 
of the search for and discovery of opportunities, and the organization of this process. Indeed, the 
main purpose of the following is to suggest avenues for research in intersection between 
entrepreneurship and the economics of the firm (and economic organization in general), rather than 
to derive distinct propositions. The big challenge here seems to be building, modeling, and testing 
suitable behavioral foundations. Advancing our understanding of entrepreneurship and its economic 
organization calls for a sustained probing of the murky ground between purely adaptive and fully 
rational expectations of human agents.  
 
TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS: SAFEGUARDING AGAINST OPPORTUNISM  
Transaction Cost Economics and Entrepreneurial Decision-making 
An entrepreneur needs to transact with other resource owners to realize a perceived business 
opportunity. In principle, the transacting process can be organized by multiple contractual 
institutions. Transaction cost economics therefore seems to be well-positioned to shed light on the 
economic organization of entrepreneurship, even though it has been criticized for not being able to 
adequately account for entrepreneurial uncertainty (e.g. Furubotn, 2002; Alvarez & Barney, 2007). 
This line of attack is, however, somewhat problematic as Williamson in particular has emphasized 
“genuine” uncertainty (Foss, 1993), and since transaction cost economics has always highlighted the 
role of bounded rationality as well as of opportunism for explaining economic organization 
(Williamson, 1975; Williamson, 1985). Bounded rationality makes comprehensive contracting 
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infeasible, since an entrepreneur is unable to fully predict how to exploit a prospective business 
opportunity – the business idea – and how to react to unforeseen disturbance. The adaptive capacity 
of governance modes becomes important (Williamson, 1991). The hierarchy facilitates continuous 
adaptation by sequential decision-making when disturbances and realignments require coordinated 
responses (Williamson, 1991; Furubotn, 2006). All these insights surely seem relevant for an 
understanding of how entrepreneurs cope with uncertainty.  
 If what critics such as Furubotn (2002) and Alvarez and Barney (2007) mean is that transaction 
cost economics hitherto has not devoted much attention to exploring entrepreneurial decision-making 
in the context of uncertainty, the critique seems more justified. However, the recent problem-solving 
perspective in transaction cost economics may be seen as an attempt to cope with entrepreneurial 
decision-making (Nickerson & Zenger, 2004; Leiblein & Macher, this volume). Essentially, 
opportunity discovery starts with a problem that needs to be solved. The entrepreneur uses a 
cognitive representation to search the space of possible resource combinations (Gavetti & Levinthal, 
2000) and then uses sequential adaptation to fine-tune and exploit the business opportunity. In 
contrast, if adaptation does not require coordinated responses among resource owners, the 
entrepreneur may rely on market contracting to achieve autonomous adaptation.  
Safeguarding Against Opportunism 
 Here, we are less concerned with the problem of adaptive capacity in value creation, but more 
with the cooperation problem manifest in the opportunism assumption of transaction cost economics. 
How can an entrepreneur safeguard her investments into a business idea against the appropriation by 
other contracting parties? Williamson’s (1985, 2000) simple contracting scheme suggests that 
contracting parties match the governance mode to the transaction attributes to safeguard investments. 
The entrepreneur becomes tied to a resource coalition if the investment into a business idea is 
relationship-specific. The exploitation of the business idea then requires access to other resources, 
leading to bilateral or multilateral dependency between contracting parties. Dependency not only 
increases the need for continuous adaptation, but also creates a possible hold-up situation for the 
entrepreneur. Other resource owners may block the pursuit of the business idea, unless they receive a 
larger share of the generated income. Thus, the entrepreneur must also decide on contractual 
safeguards to protect entrepreneurial rents in designing the business model.  
 Human agents are assumed to be boundedly rational, but transaction cost economics insist that 
they are far from myopic in designing a business model. Rather, contracting is assumed to be far-
sighted (Williamson, 1996; Williamson, 2000; cf. Foss, 2001). When entering a contractual 
relationship, the parties consider possible contractual hazards that may emerge and try to structure 
the safeguards accordingly. Without safeguards, a contracting party may be reluctant to invest into 
5 
 
specific assets, since it may suffer from the holdup problem after making the investment. Thus, an 
entrepreneur may be keenly aware of problem of safeguarding possible entrepreneurial rents before 
devoting resource to searching and developing a business idea. She will attempt to protect herself 
against opportunism by others and structure the business model around these hazards. However, 
transaction cost economics does not assume that there always is an optimal match between 
transaction characteristics and contractual safeguards (Williamson, 1985). Contracting parties may 
fail to identify a hazard when entering a relationship; safeguards may not work effectively. 
Disappointments are bound to happen. Thus, contracting may be farsighted, but it is far from perfect 
or comprehensive. Contracting partners do not form rational expectations of the (net) benefits 
(utilities) that may flow from a relation (Kreps, 1996), although they can be assumed to form rough 
estimates and “confidence intervals” of these. Viewed from this angle, the simple contracting scheme 
offers a process perspective on economic organization. It suggests that how a given transaction is 
governed may change over time, as the contracting parties learn and adapt the modes of governance 
(Furubotn, 2006). In turn, contracting partners may revise their estimates of such benefits.  
 Such process issues were downplayed (if noted) in Williamson’s seminal research in favour of 
a comparative-institutional and essentially static approach. This gave rise to the critique that a static 
approach was at variance with, for example, the assumption of bounded rationality, which would 
seem to naturally imply that agents make efforts to change the bounds on their rationality (Dow, 
1987). Bounded rationality could only be aligned with the static approach by relegating it to playing 
the limited role of explaining the incompleteness of contracting (Foss, 2003). However, recent 
research has increasingly drawn attention to the dynamic aspects of governing transactions, in effect 
taking seriously what seem to be natural implications of the assumption of bounded rationality and 
decision-making under “genuine” (or Knightian) uncertainty. For example, Mayer and Argyres 
(2004) find many changes in the contractual relationship between two parties in the personal 
computer industry that cannot be fully explained by changes in the asset specificity. They conclude 
that “the nature of this learning appears to have been quite incremental and local, that is, not very far 
sighted.”3 Other studies also found that learning and adaptation may play an important role in 
governing transactions over time (Argyres & Mayer, 2007; Argyres, Bercowitz & Mayer, 2007; 
Vanneste & Puranam, 2009). Moreover, Liebeskind and Argyres (1999) argue that the choice of 
governance modes itself may be highly path-dependent (cf. Leiblein, 2003). That is, past governance 
choices constrain how transactions could be organized in the future. They point to two important 
sources for path-dependencies in governance evolution. The first source is a formal or informal 
                                                 
3 This suggests that the expectations of boundedly rational agents may be more adaptive and myopic than farsighted.  
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contractual commitment that is binding to the degree that to renegotiate or to dissolve an agreement 
will be costly. The second source points to unexpected changes in the bargaining positions that may 
force a contracting party to hold on to an otherwise inefficient mode of governance. This line of 
analysis has clear implications for studying the economic organization of entrepreneurship, since it 
highlights heterogeneity both in opportunity discovery and appropriation resulting from past 
governance choices. 
 
OWNERSHIP AND ENTREPRENEURIAL SEARCH  
In contrast to transaction cost economics, the new property rights approach (Hart, 1995) assumes that 
contracting parties form rational expectations about contractual hazards. Contracts remain 
incomplete by the presumed inability of outside parties like legal courts to verify and enforce 
contracts. In a nutshell, contracting parties anticipate their bargaining position after entering a 
contractual relationship and adapt the incentives to make relationship-specific investments 
accordingly. The stronger the ex post bargaining position, the higher the ex ante incentives to make 
relationship-specific investments. Obtaining ownership rights over tangible and intangible assets 
strengthen the bargaining position. Ownership rights include the residual rights to control over an 
asset, the right to fill “in the blanks” of a contract, and allow the owner to exclude others from 
accessing an asset. In the new property rights approach, acquiring ownership rights is thus seen to be 
an overarching instrument to strengthen the bargaining position. Furthermore, the allocation of 
ownership rights influences the incentives to engage in entrepreneurial search and to invest into the 
development of a business idea. 
A Simple Property Rights Example 
 To provide texture to our argument, we draw on Hart and Moore (1990) and Hart (1995) and 
work through a simple example that illuminates the salient features of the new property rights 
approach. Assume that there are two aspiring entrepreneur, Bill and Mary, who interact in a vertical 
value chain. Bill is active upstream from Mary, producing an intermediate product with the help of a 
resource A. Mary produces and sells the final product, using the resource B. Both could invest into 
searching for a business idea that makes production on the respective stage of production more 
efficient or enhance its quality. We assume that the business ideas lead to a higher quality of the final 
product in the following. Both Bill and Mary are interested in making the final product more 
competitive through quality benefits, thereby allowing charging a higher price than competitors. That 
is, the vertical structure and the existing resources A and B provide guidance in the entrepreneurial 
search. The implementation of a business idea requires access to both assets A and B. The 
investments into a business idea are therefore relationship-specific. 
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 For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the relationship only exists for two periods. In t1, 
Bill and Mary separately decide on investments into searching and developing business ideas that 
increase the price of the final product. However, in t1, there is uncertainty about the exact 
specification of the intermediate product to be delivered to Mary, so the two contracting parties are 
unable to write a complete contract. Uncertainty about the specification of the intermediate product is 
resolved in t2, the final product is produced and sold. Under those conditions, both contracting 
parties may be reluctant to make substantial investments into a business idea, since they anticipate a 
possible holdup by the other contracting party. For example, after Bill making substantial 
investments into a quality-improving idea, Mary might demand a much higher quality from Bill for 
the agreed-upon price. Since Bill’s business idea requires access to both resources A and B, Bill 
grudgingly has to accept a much lower share of profit to cover his initial investment costs. This 
reasoning corresponds to the analysis in transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1985; Klein et al., 
1978). By investing into a relationship-specific business idea, the contractual relationship undergoes 
a fundamental transformation, making both parties bilaterally dependent on each other. The 
suggested remedy is vertical integration – placing the resources A and B under common ownership – 
to safeguard the specific investments. However, transaction cost economics does not address who 
should acquire whom, and, thereby, who will be the entrepreneur with a business idea. 
 The answer provided by the new property rights approach is that ownership of resources 
influences the incentives to make specific investments. Ownership of a resource is defined in terms 
of having the residual control rights over a resource, especially the right to exclude others from a 
resource. The allocation of ownership rights thereby shapes the bargaining positions of contracting 
parties. If Mary owns resources A and B, she can exclude Bill from accessing the resources and 
implementing his business idea. Due to her ownership position, she can hold Bill up and appropriate 
most of the value created by Bill’s business idea.  
 The benefits of vertical integration and placing both resources under common ownership are 
therefore the increase in bargaining power by the owner and the strengthening of the owner’s 
incentive to invest money into the search for a business idea. It also implies that there are costs to 
vertical integration, the weaker incentives to engage in entrepreneurial search by non-owners. If 
Mary owns both resources, Bill does not have a high-powered incentive to search for business ideas 
for these, since Mary can appropriate much of the value created simply by threatening Bill with 
exclusion from the needed resources. Ownership over resources thus influences the ability to 
appropriate entrepreneurial rents, and thereby shape the incentives to search for opportunities in the 
first place. It also implies that the identity of the entrepreneur matters. From a new property rights 
perspective, who develops and implements a business idea and acquires ownership rights to assets 
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critically depends on the respective potential for value creation. Mary acquires ownership rights over 
A and B if she expects that the added value outweighs the surplus created by Bill. Under those 
conditions, Mary is ready to offer a higher price for acquiring the resources and placing them under 
common ownership. Thus, what ultimately drives the vertical integration and the boundaries of a 
business model are the rational expectations about value creation. The entrepreneur forms rational 
expectations about the value of business opportunity and is willing to bet her money on the viability 
of her business idea.  
Implications 
 The simple model nevertheless allows one to derive some empirical propositions about the 
formation and evolution of business model. First, a straight-forward implication is that Mary 
becomes the owner of the business model, if Bill’s search for a business idea is insensitive to 
incentives. Under those conditions, there is no downside to vertical integration, just the positive 
effect on Mary’s incentives to engage in entrepreneurial search. Both Bill and Mary are 
entrepreneurs in the sense of searching for new business ideas. Mary is the owner of the company, 
while Bill is an employee. Second, an entrepreneur only integrates the resources A and B when they 
are complementary and relationship-specific investments make them more valuable. For example, if 
Bill’s business idea makes the resource A more productive, but he does not need resource B to create 
value, there is no need for vertical integration. Bill could sell his improved intermediate product to 
many producers of final goods. Third, financial constraints faced by an entrepreneur drives 
integration and common ownership towards resources that add relatively more value by relationship-
specific investments (Bhide, 2001). In other words, she integrates resources that provide the 
maximum expected profit per available cash (Jacobides & Winter, 2007). For resources beyond her 
reach, the entrepreneur chooses very low levels of relationship-specific investments and relies on 
generic resources obtained through market contracts, accepting the associated loss in value creation.  
Alternatively, she could also rely on hybrid contractual arrangements that provide safeguards for 
relationship-specific investments (Williamson, 1991; Dyer & Singh, 1998). Over time, the ownership 
of resources and the boundaries of a business model seem to be driven by two conflicting forces: On 
the one hand, a successful entrepreneur becomes wealthier, easing the financial constraint she faced 
in the start-up stage. On the other hand, the success of a business idea tends to increase the size of the 
market over time, increasing the number of possible trading partners for resources (Langlois & 
Robertson, 1995). Hence, investments tend to become less relationship-specific, a powerful incentive 
for vertical disintegration of a business model (Hart, 1995).  
 The analysis by the new property rights approach also casts light on the stability of a business 
model over time. Tangible assets such as machines or buildings and intangible resources like patents, 
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client lists, or brands stabilize a business model by providing a set of core resources under common 
ownership. Without such core resources, a business model may quickly fall apart. No resource owner 
within the business model then has a strong incentive to invest into the search for a business 
opportunity requiring other resources, as he will fear a possible hold-up after making substantial 
investments into entrepreneurial search. Thus, business models that create value primarily on the 
basis of the human capital often choose partnerships and joint ownership as the primary governance 
mechanism. A core resource, like client lists or brand reputation, may add stability by strengthening 
the bargaining position of the owner, thereby providing strong incentives for sustained 
entrepreneurial search. The flipside of the coin is that the set of core resources already in place 
provide guidance in entrepreneurial search (Foss & Foss, 2008). The entrepreneur within an existing 
business model tends to search for business opportunities that make use of and draw on resources 
already owned. The search for new resource combinations therefore is a path-dependent process, 
with existing resources providing guidance in the vast space of possible resource combinations 
(Denrell, Fang & Winter, 2003). 
 Overall, the new property rights approach adds important insight into entrepreneurship by 
highlighting the importance of the ex post bargaining position for the ex ante incentives to engage in 
entrepreneurial search. Expectations about possible rewards drive the search for business 
opportunities. The primary way to secure prospective entrepreneurial rents, according to the new 
property rights approach, is to acquire ownership rights of complementary resources. Ownership 
rights contain residual rights of control over a resource and especially the right to exclude other from 
accessing a resource. They increase the bargaining position of the owner vis-à-vis other resource 
owners. In addition, the resources currently under common ownership guide entrepreneurial search 
in the vast space of possible resource combinations. However, the new property rights approach at 
best allows for a stark, somewhat limited picture of entrepreneurship – only owners engage in 
entrepreneurial search and make substantial investments into relationship-specific resources. It is 
unclear how non-owners may be motivated to engage in entrepreneurial search. However, other 
insights from organizational economics allow for a richer analysis of entrepreneurial search, 
incentives, and the economic organization of entrepreneurship.  
   
THE INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF THE FIRM AND THE GROWTH OF 
ENTREPRENEURIAL VENTURES 
Incentives for Value Capture 
An entrepreneur with a potentially valuable business idea faces a dilemma (Rajan & Zingales, 
2001). One the one hand, he needs specialization and relationship-specific human capital investments 
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to increase the total value of the business idea. The problem is that he cannot own these human 
resources (absent slavery), so he needs to find contractual or organizational mechanisms to induce 
relationship-specific investments by safeguarding resource owners and protecting them against ex 
post re-contracting. This applies to prospective employees, but also to suppliers and complementors 
that he cannot integrate due to financial constraints. The property rights approach offers no solutions 
for that problem. On the other hand, he has to give the employee access to her business idea (cf. 
Rajan & Zingales, 1998). Without access to the business idea, an employee will not be able to make 
the relationship-specific investment or work productively. For example, assume that the 
entrepreneur’s idea rests on a new technology that the employee has to develop further. The 
employee needs access to the technology to work with it. However, gaining access to the technology 
also means that the employee may learn about the business idea, and then walk away with it to start 
his own venture. Without any protection against the pre-market appropriation of entrepreneurial rents 
(Stieglitz & Heine, 2007), the entrepreneur is reluctant to give access to the business idea. Less value 
is created and, ultimately, appropriated (Foss & Foss, 2005). In sum, if no safeguards for both parties 
exist, there will be no specialization, with both parties being worse off. Thus, the entrepreneur has to 
find mechanisms that allow for value capture by both parties to induce relationship-specific 
investments. Again, the ex ante incentives to invest are shaped by the ex post bargaining position.  
Internal Organization: Privileged versus Direct Access 
A possible solution to this conundrum is to give a prospective employee privileged access to 
the business idea within a vertical hierarchy (Rajan & Zingales, 1998). Access is privileged in the 
sense that only a few employees⎯the “managers”⎯have direct access to the entrepreneur’s business 
idea, while other, lower-level employees (subordinates) only have indirect access to it, provided by 
the managers above them. The vertical hierarchy gives managers an incentive to specialize by giving 
them positional power over subordinates and the ability to capture a slice of the value created by 
subordinates. The vertical hierarchy decreases the danger of employees walking away from the firm, 
since each manager on his own will not be able to compete with the entrepreneur. The relation-
specific investments by the managers gives them a stake in the firm that a) binds them to the 
entrepreneur by becoming more specialized and b) allows them to participate in the rent streams 
generated by subordinates. The business idea is thereby protected by the web of complementary 
human capital investments. However, the web must be orchestrated and built over time, putting a 
brake on the business model’s growth (Rajan & Zingales, 2001).  
In contrast, a horizontal hierarchy gives every employee direct access to the business idea, but 
not enough to compete head-on with the entrepreneur. Instead of capturing part of the value created 
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by subordinates, employees in the horizontal structure are motivated by the possibility of replacing 
the entrepreneur and inheriting her critical resource (e.g. business idea). This is the prize that the 
employees compete for, and the expected value of that prize governs the size of the horizontal 
hierarchy. Employees only specialize if the costs and risks of specialization are outweighed by the 
possible gains of making it to the top. The horizontal hierarchy will be especially prevalent if the 
entrepreneur’s critical resource is not easily expropriated by an employee, and its protection is 
relatively less important than specialization. While the horizontal hierarchy may enjoy higher growth 
in the beginning (since there is no need to slowly build vertical layers in the hierarchy), its overall 
size is limited by the expected size of the prize.  
What the analysis points to is, first, the importance of the internal structure of a business model 
for understanding value creation and value capture. How a business model is internally structured 
governs what business ideas may be developed in the future. Second, the analysis may also shed light 
on how a firm interacts with and governs external parties in the resource coalition that are not 
employees. For example, in governing suppliers, an entrepreneur is confronted with exactly the same 
issues: It wants to motivate suppliers to make relationship-specific investments while protecting its 
critical resource. A vertical hierarchy then corresponds to a multi-tiered system of suppliers, with a 
core of specialized suppliers tightly connected to the focal firm. A horizontal hierarchy has several 
suppliers competing for the ultimate prize, namely full access to business idea as a privileged partner. 
Note that these decisions translate into critical decisions about the internal and external governance 
of the firm that may have long-lasting consequences (Argyres & Liebeskind, 1999). A firm that has 
adopted a vertical hierarchy may find it very hard to switch to a different governance mode, since it 
destroys positional power of the resource owners that protect the core resource. Again, it suggests 
that a firm seeks out new business opportunities that are complementary to its existing internal 
resources (Rajan & Zingales, 2001; Rotemberg & Saloner, 1995). 
 
 EMPLOYEE ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND ORGANIZATIONAL INCENTIVES 
Although the entrepreneurship literature seems biased towards upstart firms, many business 
opportunities are in actuality discovered, evaluated and captured by existing firms. Employees often 
play a key role for developing and pursuing business opportunities (Baumol, 1993; Bhardwaj, 
Camillus & Hounshell, 2006; Foss, Foss & Klein, 2007). A problem for senior management is how 
to motivate employees to engage in the costly search for business opportunities. Usually, it is very 
difficult to compensate employees directly, since the effort tends to be costly to observe. A reward is 
possible if an employee’s business idea is adopted and implemented by the company. However, not 
all (sound) business ideas may be adopted, if implementation is costly. This creates an additional 
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problem: How does an employee form reliable expectations about what projects are adopted? Once 
again, the ex ante investment into an activity – effort into searching for a promising project – is 
driven by ex post bargaining power – the probability of a project being adopted and rewarded.  
The ex post bargaining position has two components. First, a firm needs to credibly commit 
itself to reward an employee for an adopted project (Kreps, 1990; Gibbons, 1999; cf. Baker, Murphy 
& Gibbons, 1999; Foss, 2003 on the problem of credible managerial delegation). Second, the firm 
needs to credibly convey what kind of projects it will adopt. With unclear criteria, employees may be 
reluctant to exert effort in searching for business opportunities, since they anticipate fiercer 
competition for internal funding among projects. The firm may then be better off by sticking to a 
narrow business strategy (Rotemberg & Saloner, 1994, 1995; Rajan & Zingales, 2001). It commits 
itself to only consider business ideas within a narrow, but highly profitable set of business activities, 
while disregarding all business opportunities outside of that narrow domain.4 The commitment sends 
a clear signal to employees that a project gets funded if it appears profitable and falls within the 
business domain of a firm. Hence, employees will be more motivated to search for business 
opportunities within the narrow domain, while disregarding possibilities that lay outside of the 
narrow business strategy. Obviously, this approach comes at the cost of forgoing attractive 
opportunities that are incompatible with the firm’s current business strategy. Viewed from this 
perspective, “sticking to your knitting” is an effective way to stimulate entrepreneurial search by 
employees. The analysis suggests that more innovative firms have a narrower scope of business 
activities than less innovative firms.  
An alternative approach to motivating employees’ effort into entrepreneurial search by 
strengthening their bargaining position is to employ a visionary CEO (Rotemberg & Saloner, 2000; 
Van den Steen, 2005). A visionary CEO pursues a vision for the business model’s future and 
evaluates proposed projects whether or not they fit within the vision. The CEO is therefore 
constantly biased toward certain types of projects. In that sense, the visionary CEO corresponds to a 
narrow business strategy that channels opportunity discovery. However, the CEO may recognize a 
sufficiently good project that falls outside the range of her narrow vision and may nevertheless 
choose to implement it. A necessary condition for such a decision-making process is to have a layer 
of autonomous middle managers between the CEO and the employees. In contrast to the CEO, 
middle managers do not have a bias; they promote projects solely based on their expected profit 
potential. While the CEO makes the ultimate decision about what projects to implement and reward, 
middle managers are charged with the responsibility of allocating resources to nascent projects 
                                                 
4 Obviously, such a strategy also yields the familiar Smithian specialization advantages.  
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proposed by employees. In this way, the middle managers act as an information filter for the CEO, 
passing on projects for possible implementation that are either consistent with the CEO’s vision or 
have great profit potential. It also helps employees to decide on whether to pursue a project further 
and exert effort, since allocating resources to a project sends a strong signal that it might get 
implemented and the effort rewarded. The organizational structure reduces a major weakness of a 
narrow business strategy, which eschews all business opportunities outside the narrow domain. 
 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, THE FORMATION OF BELIEFS,  
AND THE ORGANIZATIONAL EVALUATION OF OPPORTUNITIES 
Entrepreneurial Beliefs as a Research Gap 
In the introduction, we asked how expectations about value appropriation drive entrepreneurial 
search and the design of business models. The issues involved here are all cognitive ones: How do 
such expectations arise in the first place; how do they impact entrepreneurial search for business 
opportunities, and how do they link to business models?  Precious little is known about them. In fact, 
cognitive issues of this kind are usually black-boxed in the search for antecedents of 
entrepreneurship. Indeed, to the extent that cognition is represented it is usually through examining 
whether entrepreneurs are more prone to cognitive biases.5  
 Transaction cost economics, the new property rights approach, and organizational economics 
are useful starting points to address this research gap. Transaction cost economics highlights the role 
of contractual safeguards to protect entrepreneurial rents and suggests how governance mechanisms 
evolve over time. The new property rights approach puts its emphasis on how the ex post bargaining 
position secured by ownership rights influence the ex ante intensity and allocation of search efforts. 
Organizational economics helps to open up the black box of a business model by highlighting how 
the internal structure and organizational incentives influence search for business improvements by 
employees and other resource owners. As in the new property rights approach, the core mechanism 
in the analysis is how expectations about future rewards shape the search for and investment into 
value-increasing resources and projects. However, the theoretical analysis both in the new property 
rights approach and in (formal) organizational economics fundamentally rests on the assumption of 
rational expectations. Assuming rational expectations not only creates the logical problem of 
justifying incomplete contracts (Kreps, 1996; Tirole & Maskin, 1999), but it also does not sit very 
well with the insistence on Knightian uncertainty in much of the entrepreneurship and strategy 
                                                 
5 The exception to this statement is Sarasvarthy’s work on “effectuation” which explicitly tries (through “think aloud” 
methods developed in cognitive science) to map entrepreneurs’ cognitive processes (Sarasvathy, 2008).   
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literature (Foss, 2001). Entrepreneurs may not make optimal use of all available information 
(Sarasvarthy, 2001), their judgment may be biased (Busenitz & Barney, 1997), and rational 
expectations simply aren’t well-defined under the uncertain conditions faced by entrepreneurs.6  
Transaction cost economics, on the other hand, with its insistence on bounded rationality and 
its taking account of genuine uncertainty (Williamson, 1985; Foss, 2003), seems more germane to 
many relevant issues in entrepreneurship and strategy (Furubotn, 2002). Transaction cost economics 
has intellectual roots in the behavioral theory of the firm (Simon & March, 1958; Cyert & March, 
1963), but differs in an important respect: In contrast to the adaptive expectations assumed in the 
behavioral tradition, Williamson’s concept of farsighted contracting suggests a middle ground 
between adaptive, essentially backward-looking expectations and rational, forward-looking 
expectations. Exploring the murky ground between adaptive and rational expectations provide ample 
opportunities for future theoretical and empirical research. 
Judgment and Expertise 
As indicated, most contributions to the entrepreneurship literature in economics have 
essentially black-boxed entrepreneurial alertness (Kirzner, 1973), imagination (Witt, 1998), and, the 
focus here, judgment (Knight, 1921) (Sarasvarthy & Dew, 2008). While one reason could be that 
these mental processes simply escape scientific investigation,7 the traditional reason is that the 
purpose of economics work in entrepreneurship is not to explain the entrepreneurial act per se, but 
rather its consequences in terms of (the existence of) profit, firms, business cycles or economic 
growth (cf. Klein, 2008); therefore entrepreneurship is characterized in at best a highly abstract 
manner. For example, Langlois (2005:5) characterizes judgment as the ”(largely tacit) ability to 
make, under conditions of structural uncertainty, decisions that turn out to be reasonable or 
successful ex post,” but doesn’t provide details on this “ability.”   
However, if the aim is to examine entrepreneurship explicitly at the firm level, rather than 
some aggregative consequences of it, it makes sense to look more closely at the nature and 
antecedents of judgment. One take on judgment, which is consistent with the bounded rationality 
emphasis of transaction cost economics, is to treat judgment as an outcome of Smithian 
                                                 
6 As Furubotn (2002: 89) argues: “… since Knightian uncertainty prevails, the firm is not in a position to adjust its 
structure optimally for operation over time. In particular, decision-makers cannot rely on probabilistic calculations … it 
can be argued that the New Institutional Economics requires analysis to be very clear in explaining how the boundedly 
rational entrepreneur makes decisions and acquires information, and in indicating how much information he can 
reasonably be expected to acquire in any given situation.”  
7 Thus, according to Knight (1921: ) “The ultimate logic, or psychology, of these deliberations is obscure, a part of the 
scientifically unfathomable mystery of life and mind.  We must simply fall back upon a “capacity” in the intelligent 
animal to form more or less correct judgments about things, an intuitive sense of values.  We are so built that what seems 
to us reasonable is likely to be confirmed by experience, or we could not live in the world at all.” 
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specialization, namely a specific expertise. The most ambitious treatment of entrepreneurship along 
such lines is Sarasvarthy’s which explicitly draws on Simon’s work on expertise (Simon, 1983). 
Contrary to the view of entrepreneurs as envisioning some opportunity (that however, is too tacit to 
communicate to others, notably the capital markets), Sarasvarthy (Sarasvarthy & Dew, 2008: 20) 
argues that   
Expert entrepreneurs do not necessarily begin with an opportunity or market research.  
Instead, they start with who they are, what they know and whom they know.  These are 
their primary means.  What they have – i.e. capital assets, is a function of their identity, 
knowledge and networks.  As we will see in the elaboration of the process, these assets will 
fluctuate in their value as they get invested, manipulated, combined with others and 
transformed into unprecedented new possibilities. … Expert entrepreneurs may or may not 
begin with a clear vision for a new venture.  Instead their entrepreneurial strategies are 
predominately means-driven and result in new ends embodied in goals and subgoals that 
are usually characterized by specific courses of action rather than outcome variables. 
While this may be read as a claim that entrepreneurship is unreflective and haphazard, a more correct 
reading is that entrepreneurial mental models and the judgment based on such models are strongly 
influenced by the entrepreneur’s past experience and by the possibilities of action afforded by his 
existing resources.  
Such a reading is developed by Foss and Foss (2008) who, drawing on the resource-based 
view, argue that firm-level entrepreneurial opportunities emerge along paths shaped by the firm’s 
experience. However, they also argue out that property rights and transaction cost considerations are 
important to understanding the discovery and exploitation of opportunities. Two mechanisms link 
transaction costs and opportunity discovery. First, transaction costs determine how well defined and 
enforced property rights to resource attributes are; in turn, this influences the value that 
entrepreneurial resource owners expect to appropriate, and therefore their incentives to engage in 
opportunity discovery (Shepherd & DeTienne, 2005). This is the “appropriability mechanism.” 
Second, entrepreneurial experience influences opportunity discovery (e.g., Shane, 2000). However, 
experience (also) emerges from resource learning, that is, entrepreneurs’ learning about the attributes 
of resources (Mahoney, 1995). Such learning entails transaction costs, for example, the costs of 
measuring the productivity potential of employees. The transaction costs that entrepreneurs face 
influence their resource learning, introduce path dependence in such learning, and therefore influence 
which opportunities will be discovered (the “resource learning mechanism”). In other words, the 
mental models firms (‘managers) adopted from their learning experience of available opportunities 
are influenced transaction costs and property rights. Although embedded in the resource-based view 
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and property rights economics, the approach of Foss and Foss is thus akin to recent attempts to 
include learning mechanisms in transaction cost economics (Mayer & Argyres, 2004; Argyres & 
Mayer, 2007).  
Mental Models  
Recent theoretical and empirical research in the behavioral theory of the firm similarly 
suggests that agents use specialized mental models to navigate the vast space of possible resource 
combinations (cf. Nickerson & Zenger, 2004; Gavetti, 2005; Gavetti & Rivkin, 2007).8 In a 
simulation model, Gavetti and Levinthal (2000) show how the effectiveness of entrepreneurial search 
may be substantially enhanced by cognitive representations of the resource space. A cognitive 
representation is a simplified picture of the resource space. A well-informed cognitive representation 
provides guidance in opportunity discovery and allows the entrepreneur to identify attractive regions 
in a problem space. Because the cognitive representation is just a coarse-grained depiction of the 
resource space, an entrepreneur engages in local adaptation to refine the initial business idea. Thus, 
the overall conception of entrepreneurial search emerging from this stream of research is that the 
initial identification of an opportunity is initially guided by a coarse representation of possible 
resource combinations. After the discovery of a potential business idea, the entrepreneur proceeds to 
its refinement and modification (Siggelkow & Levinthal, 2003). Hence, what the cognitive 
representation fundamentally represents is the entrepreneurial expectation and speculation about 
more attractive regions in the resource space.  
The key question then is where cognitive representations come from. For technological 
innovations, an obvious source for a cognitive representation is basic science (Fleming & Sorensen, 
2004). Basic science offers an understanding of causal laws and how certain resources combine and 
interact in principle. Scientific understanding leads entrepreneurs more directly to useful resource 
combinations, eliminates fruitless paths of research, and motivates them to press on even in the face 
of negative feedback (Fleming & Sorenson, 2004: 911-912). Likewise, a cognitive representation of 
the resource space may also be informed by analogies (Gavetti, Levinthal & Rivkin, 2005; Gavetti & 
Rivkin, 2007; Gavetti & Warglien, 2007). Analogies allow entrepreneurs to take insights developed 
in one context and apply it to a new setting. Speculative entrepreneurship is thus informed by what 
the entrepreneur thinks might be a similar situation. More generally, an important source of 
                                                 
8 For a more sceptical look on the value of mental models, see Denrell, Fang & Winter (2003). They argue that 
entrepreneurs stumble upon resource combinations by serendipity. Entrepreneurial search is guided by prior access to 
idiosyncratic resources, but not by entrepreneurial cognition: “What is the role of strategizing and intentionality in this 
story? According to the argument it is unlikely that the firm acquired most of the components based on some vision of 
the value of the eventual combination. In this sense, the process of opportunity recognition is serendipitous” (Denrell, 
Fang and Winter (2003: 986).  
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entrepreneurship is the heterogeneity of expectations and cognitive representations held by human 
agents in an economy.     
While much of the literature on entrepreneurship and the behavioral theory of the firm is 
concerned with opportunity discovery and the recombination of resources for value creation, the 
analysis could also be fruitfully applied to problems of value appropriation and governance choice. 
Entrepreneurs also form cognitive representations about the major contractual hazards and about the 
most effective ways of protecting against them. These initial cognitive representations imprint the 
structure and content of the business model. It also suggests that the same transaction might be 
governed very differently, as human agents may hold heterogeneous cognitive representations (cf. 
Argyres & Liebeskind, 1999; Furubotn, 2002; Mayer & Argyres, 2004). Cognitive representations 
and the viability of resulting business models get tested in the market place, and they get updated and 
revised by feedback (Stieglitz & Heine, 2007). Thus, heterogeneity in cognitive representations plays 
out on two levels. It shapes opportunity discovery as well as opportunity exploitation. The theoretical 
and empirical knowledge about how entrepreneurs form cognitive representations, make judgments, 
and implement, adapt, and discard business models over time is rather limited. Moreover, little is 
known about how expectations about possible rewards drive entrepreneurial search and the discovery 
of new resource combinations (cf. Lippman & Rumelt, 2003b, pp. 1083-1084).    
Differential Beliefs and the Evaluation of Business Opportunities 
 The bounded rationality of human agents also implies that entrepreneurs may differ in how 
they evaluate a new resource combination (Simon, 1955; Knudsen & Levinthal, 2007). 
Heterogeneity may enter the picture in the generation and in the evaluation of alternatives. Human 
agents may look at the same possible new resource combinations, but hold very different beliefs 
about its business potential. They evaluate the same opportunity differently. Two types of errors are 
possible (Sah & Stiglitz, 1988). A human agent may underestimate the real potential of a business 
opportunity, choosing not to pursue it further. She therefore rejects a superior alternative (Type I 
error).  In contrast, an aspiring entrepreneur may overestimate the business potential of an 
opportunity, thereby accepting an inferior alternative (Type II error). Prior work on joint decision-
making structures (Sah & Stiglitz, 1988) shows that hierarchical structures prevent Type II errors and 
are prone to make Type I errors: They steer clear away from bad alternatives, but thereby also greatly 
dampen entrepreneurship by rejecting good alternatives. Polyarchic structures, on the other hand, in 
which just one decision-maker has to agree to an alternative, accept good as well as bad alternatives. 
They make more Type II errors. These findings are clearly relevant for the study of team 
entrepreneurship. In addition, it also suggests a direct link between organizational decision-making 
structures and entrepreneurship. Both represent instances of joint decision-making. The organization 
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of decision-making thereby influences the evaluation of business opportunities (Knudsen & 
Levinthal, 2007; Christensen & Knudsen, 2008). 
It also suggests that the differential ability of human agents to assess and evaluate opportunities 
has been underestimated in prior work. One way to capture this fundamental property of bounded 
rationality is the recent work on individual evaluation abilities (Knudsen & Levinthal, 2007; 
Christensen & Knudsen, 2008). It captures the ability of decision-makers to screen and evaluate 
business opportunities in probabilistic terms. Decision-makers have a high probability of accepting 
very good alternatives and a very low probability of very bad alternatives. This implies that most 
low-hanging fruits are already taken, and aspiring entrepreneurs have no troubles steering away from 
very bad ideas. However, an individual’s ability to evaluate opportunities comes into play between 
these two extremes. Here, differential ability to evaluate translates into heterogeneous beliefs about 
the potential of a business opportunity. Moreover, the ability to evaluate an opportunity is largely 
driven by an individual’s prior experience. It reflects learning and specialization. For example, an 
individual may greatly enhance the ability to evaluate opportunities within a narrow domain. Note 
that the ability to evaluate business opportunities encapsulates beliefs about possible rewards and 
channels entrepreneurial search. An entrepreneur seeks out business opportunities in domains she 
deems to be attractive.   
So far, these new behavioral foundations have not been applied to issues of entrepreneurship 
and its economic organization. One obvious avenue for further research is to apply differential 
screening abilities to the emergence and evolution of business models. Transactions with very high 
or very low level of asset specificity lead to a more uniform way of governing them across agents, 
because the contractual hazards and their solutions are rather obvious and largely independent of an 
individual’s screening ability. Rather, it is at intermediate levels of asset specificity were one expects 
to observe different governance modes to manage similar transactions.9  
Implications  
 Explicitly accounting for the heterogeneity of the mental models of management teams and 
entrepreneurs introduces an evolutionary twist that so far has been absent from transaction cost 
economics. In the context of different governance modes existing for managing similar transactions, 
Williamson (1985) refers to “mistaken integration.” However, in an entrepreneurial setting with 
fundamental uncertainty and heterogeneity, it is not necessarily obvious what is and what isn’t 
“mistaken” economic organization (Furubotn, 2002). In particular, because managers and 
                                                 
9 Furthermore, it also offers an explanation of how entrepreneurs turn into managers, namely by becoming more adept at 
evaluating opportunities within a narrower domain of the resource space (cf. Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Casson & 
Wadeson, 2007).  
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entrepreneurs hold different mental models, they will value resources differently (Barney, 1986; 
Denrell, Fang & Winter, 2003); (changes in) the boundaries of the firm may be understood in this 
light (Foss & Klein, 2005). 
 Specifically, mergers, acquisitions, divestitures, and other reorganizations can be viewed as 
responses to a valuation discrepancy.  Acquisition, for example, occurs when the value of an existing 
firm’s resources is greater to an outside party than to its current owners.  New resource combinations 
can generate efficiencies by replacing poorly performing managers, creating operating synergies, or 
establishing internal capital markets. The academic literature suggests that corporate restructurings 
do, on average, create value (Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford 2001). Given such benefits, why are 
many mergers later “reversed” in a divestiture, spin-off, or carve-out?  The first is the one associated 
with agency theory, that is, entrenched managers make acquisitions primarily to increase their own 
power, prestige or control, producing negligible efficiency gains, and that acquisitions by manager-
controlled firms are likely to be divested ex post.  Thus, acquisitions are ex ante inefficient.  
However, Matsusaka (2001) argues that often profit-seeking entrepreneurs can only learn 
about opportunities by literally trying various combinations of activities by diversifying into new 
industries (cf. also Mosakowski 1997). In fact, firms may make diversifying acquisitions even if they 
know these acquisitions are likely to be reversed in a divestiture. The process generates information 
that is useful for revising entrepreneurial plans, and thus an overall acquisition strategy may be 
successful even if individual acquisitions are not. More generally, a divestiture of previously 
acquired assets may mean simply that profit-seeking entrepreneurs have updated their forecasts of 
future conditions or otherwise learned from experience. On this view, arguing in favor ex ante 
inefficiency is suspect.  
 
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
Furthering Entrepreneurship Research by Means of the Theory of the Firm 
Although a number of economists and management scholars have pointed to a link between the 
economics of the firm and entrepreneurship (Foss, 1993; Langlois & Cosgel, 1993; Casson, 1997; 
Foss & Klein, 2005; Alvarez and Barney, 2007), explications of the link has usually been limited to 
elaboration of the Knightian argument that the existence of the firm is closely tied to the exercise of 
entrepreneurship, although a few papers link entrepreneurship to other key issues in the economics of 
the firm, notably internal organization (Foss, Foss & Klein, 2007; Stieglitz & Heine, 2007; Hsieh, 
Nickerson & Zenger, 2007), and the boundaries of the firm (Foss, Foss, Klein & Klein, 2007). This 
paper has proceeded on the assumption that the overlap between the economics of the firm and the 
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entrepreneurship field is much larger, and has suggested a number of avenues along which synthetic 
work can proceed.  
We began by suggesting that the understanding of the links between specific assets, property 
rights, value capture and value creation in organizational economics yields significant insight into the 
entrepreneur’s incentives to engage in search for opportunities, to adopt business models that 
systematize the search for and exploitation of opportunities, and to structure internal organization 
and the boundaries of the firm in such a way that expected appropriable value from opportunities is 
maximized. Essentially, this reasoning suggests that – perhaps contrary to common perception – 
there is a lot of leverage in the existing theory of the firm regarding the understanding of the 
organizational dimensions of entrepreneurship.  
However, we also explored various insights in entrepreneurship that significantly challenge 
existing theory. Much of the theory of the firm is based on “closed” neoclassical models (Foss & 
Klein, 2005) that are clearly challenged by implications of making room for entrepreneurship and 
bounded rationality, notably that mental models differ across entrepreneurs, uncertainty is pervasive, 
and opportunity discovery is a function of past differential learning and experience. An attraction of 
much recent research in property rights theory and organizational economics certainly is that its 
analysis highlights the interactions among individual agents and how these interactions translate into 
collective outcomes on the organizational level. The analysis of these interactions among individual 
agents generally rests on game theory (Gibbons, 1999). However, the closed-form solutions in game 
theory come at the price of assuming representative agents and rational expectations. As we argued 
above, important ingredients of entrepreneurship are precisely bounded rationality, pervasive 
uncertainty, and the heterogeneity of mental models and beliefs.  
One way to address the interactions among heterogeneous agents is to draw on computational 
models in building and testing theoretical insights (Epstein, 2006; Miller & Page, 2006; Davis, 
Eisenhardt & Bingham, 2007). Broadly, computational models use simulation techniques to capture 
dynamic interactions among heterogeneous agents within a task environment. These interactions are 
constrained and influenced by the economic or organizational structure. Structure may encompass 
such elements as information flows and feedback conditions, the allocation of decision rights, norms 
and organizational culture, and incentives to motivate agents (see Chang & Harrington, 2006 for a 
recent survey). Prior applications of simulation models in strategy and organization include the 
evolution of organizational structures (e.g. Carley & Svoboda, 1996; Miller, 2001), individual effort 
and free-riding (Axtell, 1999), organizational norms (March, 1991), information-processing (Carley, 
1992; Barr & Saraceno, 2002), and adaptation in complex task environments (Levinthal, 1997; 
Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2005; Ethiraj & Levinthal, 2002; Knudsen & Levinthal, 2007). While these 
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contributions have shed light on organizational processes, explicit contributions to fundamental 
issues of entrepreneurship are thus far virtually non-existent, providing fertile ground for future 
research.      
 
Researching Entrepreneurship and the Theory of the Firm 
The main purpose of this essay has been to argue that there is a significant potential for 
theoretical development of the intersection between entrepreneurship and the theory of the firm 
beyond the existing small amount of mainly Knightian work on this (Langlois & Cosgel, 1993; Foss 
& Klein, 2005). We have thus pointed to several distinct research streams in, particularly, the theory 
of the firm literature and indicated various ways in which it can illuminate the understanding of the 
exercise and organization of entrepreneurship. Several research questions emerge from the 
discussion, for example, concerning the role of access as an antecedent of employees’ 
entrepreneurship, whether the diversity of the firm’s product portfolio influences the amount of 
employee entrepreneurship, and the role of the organizational structure in the process of evaluating 
potential entrepreneurial opportunities. While levels issues may be involved in researching these 
topics (because they link employee behaviours and organizational structure and scope), calling for a 
multi-level empirical methodology, these research questions still seem researchable with fairly 
conventional cross-sectional approaches, and significant empirical progress may be made on the 
basis of even single-respondent designs.  
Significant challenges to empirical research seem to arise, however, in conceptualizing the 
relevant dependent variables and in introducing behavioural elements. With respect to the former, 
there are few established methodologies for measuring entrepreneurship. The empirical literature 
seems to be converging on the notion of “opportunity discovery” (Shane, 2002, 2003) as the relevant 
variable, but is by no means obvious how it should be measured. In fact, Klein (2008) suggests that it 
is inherently a latent variable which obviously leaves substantial discretion regarding its 
conceptualization and measurement.   
  An even bigger challenge concerns building and modeling suitable behavioral foundations for 
understanding the link between entrepreneurship and economic organization. It is, for example, far 
from clear how mental models of entrepreneurial opportunities are best modeled, not to speak of 
differential mental models, and how such models exactly translate into implications for the economic 
organization of entrepreneurship (cf. Knudsen & Levinthal, 2007; Christensen & Knudsen, 2008 for 
recent advances along these fronts). A significant problem in extending thinking about 
entrepreneurship and economic organization lies in finessing these issues.  
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